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CObjective: To investigate Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regula-
tory actions against drug companies’ health economic promotions
from 2002 through 2011 to understand how frequently and in what
circumstances the agency has considered such promotions false or
misleading. Methods: We reviewed all warning letters and notices of
iolation (“untitled letters”) issued by the FDA’s Division of Drug Mar-
eting, Advertising and Communications (DDMAC) to pharmaceutical
ompanies from January 2002 through December 2011. We analyzed
etters containing a violation related to “health economic promotion,”
efined according to one of several categories (e.g., implied claims of
ost savings due to work productivity or economic claims containing
nsupported statements about effectiveness or safety). We also col-
ected information on factors such as the indication and type of media
nvolved and whether the letter referenced Section 114 of the Food and
rug Administration Modernization Act. Results: Of 291 DDMAC let-ters sent to pharmaceutical companies during the study period, 35 O
luati
t, Bo
al So
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2012.05.00212%) cited a health economic violation. The most common type of
iolation cited was an implied claim of cost savings due to work pro-
uctivity or functioning (found in 20 letters) and economic claims con-
aining unsubstantiated comparative claims of effectiveness, safety, or
nterchangeability (7 letters). The violations covered various indica-
ions, mostly commonly psychiatric disorders (6 letters) and pain (6
etters). No DDMAC letter pertained to Food and Drug Administration
odernization Act Section 114. Conclusion: The FDA has cited inap-
ropriate health economic promotions in roughly 12% of the letters
ssued by the DDMAC. The letters highlight drug companies’ interest in
romoting the value of their products and the FDA’s concerns in cer-
ain cases about the lack of supporting evidence.
eywords: FDAMA Section 114, Food and Drug Administration, health
conomics, promotional claims.
opyright © 2012, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
utcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates pharma-
ceutical labeling and advertising to ensure that claims made by
drug companies about their products are not false or misleading.
The agency has interpreted its mandate broadly to include “virtu-
ally all information dissemination activities by or on behalf of a
prescription drug manufacturer” [1]. Thus, FDA oversight includes
promotional materials containing health economic claims, such as
statements that a drug “saves money” or “lowers costs.”
The FDA’s Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising and Com-
munications (DDMAC) monitors and reviews pharmaceutical pro-
motions and takes action against advertisements found to be
“false, lacking in fair balance, or otherwise misleading” [2].
(DDMAC was renamed the Office of Prescription Drug Promotions
in September 2011, but we retain the name DDMAC in this article
because it prevailed during all but 4 months of the study period.)
All pharmaceutical promotional pieces distributed in the United
States must be submitted to the DDMAC at the time of initial dis-
semination [3]. For promotions that the DDMAC considers in vio-
lation of regulatory standards, actions may include an “untitled”
letter of notice of violation or a formal warning letter [4]. Warning
letters are more serious than untitled letters, and failure to ad-
dress issues raised in them may result in recalls, seizures, injunc-
tions, administrative detention, and criminal prosecution [4].
* Address correspondence to: Peter J. Neumann, Center for the Eva
Health Policy Studies, Tufts Medical Center, 800 Washington Stree
E-mail: pneumann@tuftsmedicalcenter.org.
1098-3015/$36.00 – see front matter Copyright © 2012, Internation
Published by Elsevier Inc.Drug company promotion of health economic information tar-
geted toward individual physicians or consumers must adhere to
FDA’s conventional “substantial evidence” provision, which typi-
cally means that statements must be supported by two adequate
and well-controlled clinical trials [5,6]. U.S. law makes an excep-
tion for health economic information targeted to formulary com-
mittees or similar entities. Such communication is governed by
Section 114 of the Food and Drug Modernization Act (FDAMA),
which stipulates that health economic information provided un-
der these circumstances shall not be considered false or mislead-
ing if it directly relates to an indication approved and is based on
“competent and reliable scientific evidence” (rather than substan-
tial evidence) [7].
Little is known about how the FDA has regulated health eco-
nomic promotions, including how vigilantly it has overseen the
area, and the types of economic promotions it has found lacking.
Previously, we analyzed FDA regulatory actions on health eco-
nomic promotions from 1997 through 2001 [8]. We found that
roughly 5% of the letters issued during that period cited a false or
misleading health economic claim—most commonly an economic
promotion containing an “unsupported comparative claim of ef-
fectiveness, safety, or interchangeability.” Since 2001, the health
care landscape has changed with ever more intense focus on the
on of Value and Risk in Health, Institute for Clinical Research and
x #063, Boston, MA 02111.
ciety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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949V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 9 4 8 – 9 5 3economic value of therapies. In this article, we expand on our
previous analysis and update it through 2011. Our objectives were
to understand the frequency and nature of FDA regulatory actions
against inappropriate health economic promotions since 2001. We
also investigated whether the FDA has ever issued a regulatory
action pertaining to a violation of FDAMA Section 114.
Methods
FDA notice of violation and warning letters
The FDA’s Web site provides the full text of all warning letters and
notices of violation (“untitled letters”) issued to pharmaceutical
companies for various kinds of infractions [9,10]. Between January
2002 and December 2011, the FDA issued 598 such letters. We
restricted our review to the subset of letters issued by FDA’s
DDMAC during this time period (n  291). Thus, we excluded let-
ters pertaining to manufacturer site inspections or good labora-
tory practices, investigator- or sponsor-related conduct, approval
and labeling requirements and drug security, and other uncatego-
rized compliance issues (Fig. 1).
Data abstraction and analysis
We searched the DDMAC letters for health economic violations in
several stages. First, we entered all 291 DDMAC letters into a single
pdf file and searched it electronically by using 32 key words, such
as “cost,” “savings,” “expenditure,” “spending,” “price,” “eco-
nomic,” “affordable,” “pharmacoeconomics,” and “productivity”
Fig. 1 – Search methodology. *Includes letters sent by
FDA’s Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising and
Communication (DDMAC), Division of Compliance Risk
Management and Surveillance, Division of Manufacturing
and Product Quality, Division of New Drugs and Labeling
Compliance, or the Division of Scientific Investigations
between January 22 and December 2011. DDMAC was
renamed the Office of Prescription Drug Promotions in
September 2011, but we retain the name DDMAC in this
article because it prevailed during the study period.
†Keywords included cost, savings, expenditure, expensive,
expense, spending, price, pricing, economic, affordable,
value, cost-effectiveness, cost effectiveness, cost-benefit,
cost benefit, pharmacoeconomic, hospitalization,
utilization, doctor visit, physician visit, office visit, registry,
observable data, copay, co-pay, budget, productivity,
Section 114, fired, job, and work (defined as place of
employment [n.] or to be employed [v.]).(see Notes to Fig. 1 for the full list).The key words were selected on the basis of our earlier work
and expanded upon to include economic terms found in health
economic print advertisements [8,11]. Note that we included “pro-
ductivity” claims, because work productivity is an important com-
ponent of health economic analysis, though we had neglected to
include it in our previous work. This search yielded 120 candidate
letters. We randomly selected a sample of 30 of the 291 DDMAC
letters for manual reading to examine whether any contained
health economic claims not captured in the electronic search. We
identified no such letters.
One of us (SKB) then read the entire text of each of the 120
candidate letters to determine whether it contained a genuine
health economic violation. We considered a letter to contain a
health economic violation if it included an infraction cited by the
FDA pertaining to drug price or co-payment, cost per dosage, fail-
ure to consider or advertise certain costs, misleading or inappro-
priate claims about work productivity, or avoided hospitalization
or surgery, or any mention of other economic or financial issues.
Finally, we reviewed each of the resulting economic violation let-
ters with the aid of a data abstraction form. On the basis of public
remarks by a DDMAC official about the type of action that may
constitute a health economic violation [12] and an expansion of
ur earlier work [8], we categorized each letter into one of several
ossible categories:
Implied claims of cost savings due to work productivity/func-
tioning;
Unsupported claim of effectiveness, safety, or interchange-
ability;
Implied claims of cost savings to broader audience than appli-
cable;
Claims of cost savings when there are obvious additional costs
that may affect cost savings;
Cost comparisons of dosages that are not comparable;
Claims that encouraged switching on the basis of a lower price
when there may be risks associated with the switch; and
Other misleading price comparisons.
We also collected information from each correspondence on
he type of letter (warning or untitled), the company, product, in-
ication, type of media involved (e.g., print, video), target audience
consumers, professionals), and whether the letter made any
ention of FDAMA Section 114. FDA requires pharmaceutical
ompanies to submit all pieces of promotional labeling or adver-
ising for a drug product at the time of its initial release, and each
ust be accompanied by Form 2253, “Transmittal of Advertise-
ents and Promotional Labeling for Drugs and Biologics for Hu-
an Use” [3]. We based our media category on the scheme used on
orm 2253.
We pilot-tested the form on a sample of 25 letters and revised it
or clarity and completeness. Most warning or untitled letters on
he FDA’s Web site are accompanied by the actual promotional
aterials containing economic violations, either as separate doc-
ments or at the end of letters themselves. In the majority of the
ases (32 out of the 35 letters with health economic violations), we
ere able to download the promotional materials containing the
conomic violation. For the three cases in which we could not
ownload the promotional materials, one was an oral statement
ade at a conference, one was a DVD that was not posted, and one
rovided a link to a file that was not working.
Results
Of the 291 DDMAC letters issued to pharmaceutical companies
(196 untitled letters and 95 warning letters), 35 (12%) cited an eco-
nomic violation (including 14 warning letters and 21 untitled let-
ters). The number of economic violation letters has remained
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950 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 9 4 8 – 9 5 3steady over time, with roughly 2 to 3 per year, with the exception
of 2010, during which 11 were issued (Table 1).
The most common type of economic violation (found in 20
letters) was an implied claim of cost savings due to work produc-
tivity or functioning (Table 2). The next most frequent type per-
tained to an economic promotion containing an unsupported
comparative claims of effectiveness, safety, or interchangeability
(7 letters), followed by implied claims of cost savings to a broader
audience than applicable (3 letters), and cost comparisons of dos-
ages that are not comparable (3 letters). Appendix 1 in Supplemen-
tal Materials found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2012.05.002
contains examples of the relevant text from selected FDA letters
citing economic violations.
The type of media cited in the economic violation letters has
varied (Table 3). Twelve letters (30%) cited economic promotion
violations in professional sales aids, which included detailers, bro-
chures, and leave behinds. Six (15%) contained economic claims in
Internet promotions, while other letters cited video (four letters),
consumer print advertisements (three letters), consumer televi-
sion advertisements (two letters), and direct mail (two letters).
Over one third of the media cited was directed to consumers, while
23% targeted professionals. Economic violation letters have cov-
ered various indications, mostly common psychiatric disorders
(six letters), pain (six letters), and cancer (four letters) (Table 4). All
the economic violations relating to psychiatric disorders and five
of the six letters relating to pain pertained to inappropriate pro-
ductivity claims (data not shown).
Discussion
How actively the FDA has regulated economic promotions has
been little studied. Moreover, the FDA has never released formal
guidance about what constitutes an inappropriate economic
claim, leaving some question about what constitutes an infrac-
tion. However, by analyzing FDA warning letters and notices of
violation, one can quantify the agency’s regulatory activities and
begin to infer its thinking about the topic. The economic violation
letters in our sample thus comprise a body of “case law” on the
types of economic claims the FDA considers false or misleading.
While the letters themselves do not provide information about
the frequency with which drug companies make health economic
claims, they do indicate that companies are, at least to some ex-
tent, actively promoting the economic value of their products. In
Table 1 – DDMAC warning letters and notices of
violation for economic claims 2002–2011.
Year DDMAC
Letters
Number of letters
with economic
violations
Percentage of letters
with economic
violations
2002 28 1 3.6
2003 25 4 16.0
2004 23 3 13.0
2005 29 2 6.9
2006 22 2 9.1
2007 19 3 15.8
2008 21 5 23.8
2009 41 3 7.3
2010 52 11 21.2
2011 31 1 3.2
Total
letters
291 35 12.0
DDMAC, Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising and
Communication.other work, we have reported that roughly 10% of print drug ad-vertisements in major clinical journals contain an economic mes-
sage, most frequently a statement that a drug is “less expensive”
or “costs less” than its competitors [11,13]. In addition, elsewhere
we have surveyed drug company officials who report some degree
of health economic promotion directly to formulary committees
by using the provisions of FDAMA Section 114 [6].
The current study confirms that the FDA continues to monitor
the field, at least to some extent, and to express concern about
certain inappropriate economic promotions. The agency has is-
sued several letters per year pertaining to economic violations. In
2010, 11 such letters were issued— the spike in that year coincided
with a greater number of total DDMAC letters sent to pharmaceu-
tical companies, apparently reflecting President Obama’s appoint-
ment of Margaret A. Hamburg, MD, as FDA Commissioner and her
pledge to step up enforcement of misleading industry practices
[14,15].
The FDA has expressed concern mostly about work function
and “backdoor” clinical claims (i.e., about effectiveness or safety)
embedded in economic promotions. The 20 FDA letters mention-
ing work productivity provide a window into how drug companies
are promoting the workplace-enhancing potential of their prod-
ucts, as well as FDA unease about the practice. These letters cover
various diseases, particularly attention deficit/hyperactivity disor-
der (five letters) and pain (five letters).
The five letters on attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, for
example, highlight FDA’s distress over promotions linking atten-
tion deficit/hyperactivity disorder to poor work performance, and
implying—without substantial evidence or substantial clinical ex-
perience—that the medications themselves reduce unemploy-
ment, improve job success, or enhance economic status [16–20]. In
other such letters, the agency has cited promotions implying,
without substantiating evidence, that drugs providing pain relief
will cause fewer work disruptions [21] or allow patients to resume
ormal daily activities such as going to work [22,23]. A promotion
or Pamine (methscopolamine) was cited for suggesting that free-
om from diarrhea led to improved work performance [24].
In similar fashion, the FDA has called out a promotion for Lu-
ox CR (fluvoxamine) for social anxiety/obsessive-compulsive dis-
rder [25] for implying that the product would help return patients
o normal work functioning. A letter on Provigil (modafinil) stated
hat while the drug may improve wakefulness, it does not neces-
arily follow—as implied in the promotion—that Provigil is bene-
Table 2 – Economic violations cited by DDMAC 2002–
2011 (N = 35).
Violation Number %
Implied claims of cost savings due to work
productivity or functioning
20 55.6
Unsupported comparative claim of
effectiveness, safety, or interchangeability
7 19.4
Implied claims of cost savings to broader
audience than applicable
3 8.3
Cost comparisons of dosages that are not
comparable
3 8.3
Other misleading price comparisons or
financial claims
2 5.6
Claims of cost savings when there are obvious
additional costs that may affect cost savings
1 2.8
Total number of economic violations 36* 100
DDMAC, Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising and Communica-
tions.
* One letter contained two economic violations. Thus, the total
number of economic violations cited (36) exceeds the total num-ber of letters with economic violations (35).
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951V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 9 4 8 – 9 5 3ficial with respect to . . . occupational function associated with
shift-work sleep disorder [26]. Yet another letter pertaining to
ivitrol (naltrexone) for alcohol dependence cited a brochure link-
ng dependence to serious problems at work. The FDA stated that
he brochure inappropriately implied that the drug had demon-
trated productivity benefits [27]. Two letters on HIV treatments
ited promotions that suggested that HIV management enhanced
ork productivity while maintaining undetectable HIV (“It enables
e to also be a businessman once I manage my HIV” and “I still
ork and have a long day in the office and I think that the medi-
ine has really been good for me”) [28,29]. Finally, in one case, FDA
cited promotions for Eligard (leuprolide), a palliative for advanced
prostate cancer, that implied, without evidence, that a less de-
manding injection schedule would make it easier both for patients
to keep appointments between business trips and for physicians
to improve the efficiency of their daily office practice [30].
Regarding nonproductivity economic violations, FDA has ex-
pressed concern mostly about comparative clinical content em-
bedded in economic claims. As an example, one letter noted that
an advertisement misleadingly suggested that because Flonase
(fluticasone) was “comparable or superior to other allergy medi-
cines, the consumer need consider only the possible insurance
co-payment cost in considering switching to Flonase” [31].
FDA concerns also pertain to economic promotions containing
implied claims to broader dosages and audiences than are appli-
Table 3 – Communication media cited in economic violatio
Medium Number
Professional sales aid (detailer) 12
Internet promotion 6
Video or video tape 4
Consumer print advertisements 3
Consumer radio 1
Professional file card 1
Professional slides 1
Consumer television 2
Direct mail 2
Other† 8
Total number of communication media‡ 40 1
* Excluded media cited in economic letters unrelated to the econom
† Other includes all terms used in letters that did not match categ
promotional statements (either oral or in printed quotation), patie
‡ Does not equal total number of letters because more than one med
Table 4 – Indications cited in economic violation letters.
General indication Number of economic letters
citing the indication*
%†
Psychiatric disorder 6 17.1
Pain 6 17.1
Cancer or cancer-related 4 11.8
HIV 3 8.8
Nasal/respiratory illness 3 8.8
Irritable bowel syndrome 2 5.9
Other* 11 32.4
Total 35 100
* Indications mentioned in one letter include alcoholism, bacterial
infection, imaging, infertility, myelodysplastic syndrome, psoria-
sis, hepatic injury, skin/frown lines, sleep disorder, testosterone
replacement, and unknown.
† Percentages add up to more than 100% because one drug is indi-cated for two disease areas.cable. One letter stated, for example, that “a cost chart suggests
that Norvir (ritonavir), at a dosage of 100 milligrams/day, has the
lowest daily cost of all the antiretroviral drugs listed. However,
FDA has found Norvir to be safe and effective only at the dosages
set forth in the PI (300-600 mg twice daily)” [32]. Another cited
Nasonex (memotasone), indicated for allergic rhinitis, for claiming
that congestion affects over half of all people at work, and imply-
ing inappropriately that the product is indicated for congestion in
addition to allergic rhinitis [33].
Importantly, our study highlights that the FDA has never is-
sued a warning letter or notice of violation pertaining to an in-
fringement of FDAMA Section 114. In some ways, this is surprising,
given the prominence of the provision—it is the only statutory
language devoted specifically to evidentiary standards for health
economic promotions.
The absence of any DDMAC letters on Section 114 may reflect
one or more of several factors. On the one hand, it may signal
relatively little use of the provision by drug companies. In partic-
ular, the emergence of the Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy
format and its use by US health plans as a vehicle for receiving
information on the clinical and economic value of drugs has pro-
vided a separate nonpromotional channel for the exchange of
health care economic information between drug companies and
health plans. Dossiers submitted under the Academy of Managed
Care Pharmacy format can contain economic models and off-label
data, but the information can be provided by drug companies only
in response to a health plan’s “unsolicited request’” and thus is
nonpromotional [6]. To some extent, this channel for communi-
cating health economic information may have co-opted Section
114 [34]. The advantage of Section 114, however, is that it permits
the active promotion of health economic information. It permits
drug companies to initiate a conversation about health econom-
ics. Indeed, our previous research on the topic suggests that out-
comes directors in drug companies view this type of promotion as
important—and as more important than Academy of Managed
Care Pharmacy dossier economic information [6].
The absence of FDA letters about Section 114 may simply re-
flect the challenges FDA faces in regulating the kinds of business-
to-business promotions covered by the law (e.g., companies may
promote economic claims under Section 114 via in-person presen-
tations, which are difficult to police). It also suggests that FDA has
assigned a low priority to regulating Section 114 promotional
claims compared with other areas.
Our previous research on FDA regulatory letters regarding eco-
nomic claims, the only empirical analysis on the subject of which
ters*.
Professionals Consumers Unspecified*
6 4 2
0 1 5
0 3 1
0 3 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
0 2 0
1 0 1
0 1 7
9 15 16
lation.
presented on Form 2253, including cost chart, pocket dosing card,
file piece/card, and other unspecified promotional pieces.
pe may be cited per letter.n let
%
30.0
15.0
10.0
7.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
5.0
5.0
20.0
00.0
ic vio
ories
nt prowe are aware, also revealed some level of vigilance by the agency.
952 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 9 4 8 – 9 5 3From 1997 to 2001, roughly 5% of the DDMAC letters to drug com-
panies cited inappropriate economic promotion [8]. Our current
study includes work productivity violations, which were not ac-
counted for in our previous analysis, and which comprise over half
of the violations from 2002 to 2011. In terms of nonproductivity
economic violations, FDA issued economic violation letters in
roughly the same percentage of total letters from 2002 to 2011 (6%)
compared with the earlier period (5%), though the total number of
FDA letters issued per year has declined over time from 114 per
year between 1997 and 2001 to 29 per year between 2002 and 2011.
The trend may suggest less rigor in the degree to which the
DDMAC has regulated promotional activity overall, though little
change in its oversight of economic claims relative to clinical
claims.
There are several limitations to this analysis. As noted, our
study does not shed light on the extent to which drug companies
are actually promoting economic information, only the degree to
which the FDA is regulating such activity. There are no data on the
total number of submissions of promotional materials to the
DDMAC, or the number of these submissions that are actually
reviewed by the FDA. Thus, we do not know whether the FDA is
being particularly vigilant about health economic promotions rel-
ative to their frequency in practice. In addition, there are no data
on regular correspondence between the DDMAC and pharmaceu-
tical companies over economic claims that did not result in either
a notice of violation or a warning letter. Another limitation is that
we did not include adherence, compliance, or convenience claims
or any patient-reported outcomes (PROs), and the field would ben-
efit from future work in those areas.
In general, data should be interpreted with caution. One might
infer that given the relatively low frequency of economic violation
letters, the FDA ignores most health economic claims or that the
pharmaceutical industry generally avoids making such claims.
Moreover, when claims about health economics are made, the
FDA tends to examine the “clinical aspects” underlying these
claims and objects to those aspects. This is consistent with the
finding of the two major categories where violations were cited:
productivity and “unsupported claim of effectiveness, safety, or
interchangeability.” Furthermore, the flurry of “productivity” let-
ters may reflect industry promotional efforts more than FDA en-
forcement trends, though it could also reflect the FDA’s focus on
an area of promotion that it believes is out of hand.
In terms of recommendations for the field, possibly formal FDA
guidance on economic claims would help. On the one hand, such
guidance may be unnecessary, given that linking a claim to the
required level of evidence is a fundamental expectation for phar-
maceutical companies and that FDA has generally made require-
ments for superiority claims clear. Moreover, it is not clear how
much confusion actually exists within pharmaceutical companies
about what types of economic claims are permissible. To some
extent, the regulatory letters may reveal a “cat-and-mouse” game,
with some companies trying to push the boundaries in making
economic claims, despite lacking supporting evidence. Rather
than a call for guidance, our findings could be interpreted as sim-
ply underscoring the need for companies to be more careful about
making promotional claims and more disciplined about using ex-
isting FDA guidance when creating and approving economic
claims.
On the other hand, guidance could help clarify certain gray
areas surrounding health economic claims. One example pertains
to FDAMA Section 114, where studies have suggested that confu-
sion persists within pharmaceutical companies about when to use
the section [13]. Our prior survey of outcomes directors within
drug companies found that 75% of the respondents favored FDA
guidance on Section 114, particularly surrounding the definition of
“competent and reliable scientific evidence’” [6].FDA guidance might also address other areas, such as produc-
tivity claims. Arguably, such claims are covered by the FDA’s ex-
isting guidance for industry on PRO measures [35]. The PRO guid-
ance states, for example, that “PRO-based evidence of improved
symptoms alone will only support claims specific to improvement
of the symptoms and would not support a general claim related to
improvement in a patient’s ability to function or the patient’s psy-
chological state.” Such language might be interpreted as prohibit-
ing the kinds of productivity claims cited in this article—for exam-
ple, those extrapolating from symptom relief to work function.
Nonetheless, further clarification of when it is permissible to make
work productivity claims and what substantiating evidence is
needed might be helpful.
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